The protocol is executed for rounds. . Graph 3-coloring ZKP is a computational zero-knowledge proof, see [4] .
A ZKP is usually performed between the machines. One of interesting questions is what happens if a human is made part of such a protocol. Apart from a theoretical considerations there is a least one hint that this might become more and more popular situation. The theorem by Manuel Blum states that any statement with a finite proof formulated in the logical proof system (eg. Russell and Whitehead system) can be proven by ZKP. He even entitled his original paper as "How to prove a theorem so no one else can claim it"( [5] Below we outline theoretical reasoning and briefly describe practical experiments that took place. First let's consider Bob being a human. His job is simple: chose an edge at random and check coloring of vertices. Any chance of cheating him? Well, if Alice (Prover) can spot a pattern in Bob's choices for edges in the protocol rounds, she can employ adaptive strategy that increases chances for successful cheating. It is interesting as a way to attack ZKP from the Alice side, yet it is only a part of a larger problem, which we describe next. Let's consider Alice being a human. She has twofold assignment: to convince Bob and to protect a secret, in this case 3-coloring of the graph. The later can be in danger if she does not permute colors at random. While the attack is a little tricky and beyond the scope of this paper, it should be emphasized that such patterns can be observed and leak information in certain protocol rounds. Obtained information allows to derive coloring for some parts of the graph, which with sufficient number of rounds can allow to recover coloring for the whole structure. So, it should be clear by now that question of humans taking part in ZKP reduces very much to the quality of randomness that they can generate. Or more precisely how random they are when repeatedly choosing elements from a set of some fixed cardinality/fixed size? In summer 2005, in order to answer this question we ran few series of experiments involving over 20 selected volunteers. They were mainly graduate and PhD students majoring in mathematics, computer science or physics. We also had few people with PhD from one of listed above fields. Test were carried out in computer lab with a help from custom made software. We simulated ZKP by asking them generate random permutations, very much in a way like Alice in the real protocol. The experiment consisted of 4 different tests run on different days. Apart from permutations on 3 elements that correspond to 3COL, each person was asked to perform permutations on 2 and 4 elements. They were not forbidden to use any personal helping device. Also in about 50% of cases (chosen at random), individual was allowed to see list of permutations that she entered previously. Tests 1 and Test 2 were designed as an introductory phase, which allowed to: a. get people used to the experiment; b. collect individual benchmark for every test participant; c. check whether experiment was executed correctly. Test 3 was proper simulation of 3COL ZKP (few hundred rounds), with an award promised to the best (the most random) performer. After the Test 3 results were discussed with participants and emerging patterns presented. Only then participants learned that they were playing 3COL ZKP -the original instruction asked them to generate random permutations for "cryptographic purposes". Next, we held a seminar devoted to 3COL ZKP. Apart from the theory people participating in the experiment learned how patterns in generated permutations can compromise the secret. With all these knowledge and motivation they were asked to do Test 4, which setup was the same as Test 3. Next, results were analyzed across all tests. The analysis was carried out for every individual concerned as well as on aggregated results. The picture varied much from person to person, allowing to compute individual fingerprints. Few individual obtained results of quality superior to others. As far as we know they were not using anything more then their brains. Aggregated results were biased to the extend which allows to design general attack on 3COL ZKP with human Prover. It came as a surprise that results are strongly correlated with number of elements in the permutation.
